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Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: The 
Death of the Substantial Similarity Test in Digital 
Sampling Copyright Infringement Claims – The 
Sixth Circuit’s Flawed Attempt at a Bright-Line 
Rule 
Matthew R. Brodin∗ 
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if 
any, things which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original 
throughout.  Every book in literature, science and art, borrows and must 
necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used 
before . . . . If no book could be the subject of copy-right which was not 
new and original in the elements of which it is composed, there could be 
no ground for any copy-right in modern times, and we would be obliged 
to ascend very high, even in antiquity, to find a work entitled to such 
eminence.  Virgil borrowed much from Homer; Bacon drew from earlier 
as well as contemporary minds; Coke exhausted all the known learning 
of his profession; and even Shakespeare and Milton . . . would be found 
to have gathered much from the abundant stores of current knowledge 
and classical studies in their days. 
-Justice Story1 
INTRODUCTION 
In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,2 the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals announced a new bright-line rule for 
sound recording copyright infringement that will have 
                                                          
 ∗ J.D. expected 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2000, 
University of Colorado - Boulder. 
 1. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) 
(Story, J.). 
 2. 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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significant effects on the hip-hop music industry.3  In this case 
the rap group NWA sampled a single chord from George 
Clinton’s “Get Off Your Ass and Jam,” altered the pitch and 
tempo, and used it in their song “100 Miles and Runnin’.”4  The 
owners of the sound recording copyright to Clinton’s song sued 
Dimension Films for infringement after the song was included 
in the soundtrack to the Dimension movie “I Got the Hookup.”5  
The district court held that the amount copied from “Get Off” 
was so small that it was not legally cognizable, or in other 
words, the use was de minimis.6  The Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed, announcing a new rule that made the 
sampling of a copyright protected sound recording a per se 
infringement regardless of the amount copied.7  The hip-hop 
industry is worried that this decision will negatively impact 
creativity by significantly limiting the amount of music that 
artists can legally sample.8 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court opinion and announced the new bright-line rule based 
upon its interpretation of the Copyright Act of 1976.9  Although 
the academic and business publications on the subject offer 
support for both the court of appeals opinion and the district 
court opinion, the Sixth Circuit‘s interpretation is not 
supported by any judicial precedent and is contrary to the 
existing persuasive decisions from other districts.   
This comment examines the language and the purpose of 
the Copyright Act, the applicable case law, and the legal and 
professional articles on copyright law as applied to digital 
sampling to determine the proper test for establishing the 
infringement of a sound recording copyright.  Part I outlines 
the history of hip-hop music and digital sampling, summarizes 
the relevant sections of the Copyright Act, and reviews the 
                                                          
 3. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (“Bridgeport II”), 383 F.3d 
390, 393 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (“Bridgeport I”), 230 F. 
Supp. 2d 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 7. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 393. 
 8. See, e.g., Eric Olsen, 3 Notes and Runnin’: Sample Ruling Protest 
(Sept. 15, 2004) (calling the ruling a “disaster”), at 
http://blogcritics.org/archives/2004/09/15/200145.php (last visited Apr. 8, 
2005); Chris Reynolds, Sampling the Future, TECHNICIAN (Sept. 16, 2004), at 
http://www.technicianonline.com/story.php?id=010041 (last visited Mar. 24, 
2005).  
 9. See Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 396-401. 
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applicable case law.  Part II analyzes the decisions of both the 
district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films10 with respect to 
that background.  Part III concludes that the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision is inconsistent with the language and purpose of the 
Copyright Act, and that the correct decision is the one outlined 
in the opinion by the district court. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  DIGITAL SAMPLING AND THE BIRTH OF HIP-HOP MUSIC 
Digital music sampling is the practice of digitally recording 
existing sound recordings and adding them to other sampled or 
original sound recordings to create new music.11  The process 
involves three main steps: digital recording, computer analysis 
and alteration, and playback.12  Modern digital sampling 
equipment allows the user to isolate vocal and instrumental 
sounds and alter their pitch, tempo, and timbre.13  This 
provides the sampler with the ability to record and playback an 
entire sound recording exactly as it sounded in the original, or 
to take smaller samples of the recording and manipulate them 
into completely new and unrecognizable sounds.14  The 
technological advancements provided by digital sampling 
create a wide range of copyright questions that have not been 
consistently analyzed or answered by either the courts or 
Congress. 
The origins of hip-hop music and the modern practice of 
digital sampling have been traced to the innovative disc jockeys 
(DJs) or “selectors” in Jamaica in the late 1950’s and early 
1960’s.15  During this period DJs traveled around the island 
performing in small makeshift discos.16  To attract larger 
                                                          
 10. 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 11. David S. Blessing, Who Speaks Latin Anymore?: Translating De 
Minimis Use for Application to Music Copyright Infringement and Sampling, 
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2399, 2403 (2004). 
 12. Jeffrey R. Houle, Digital Audio Sampling, Copyright Law and the 
American Music Industry: Piracy or Just a Bad “Rap”?, 37 LOY. L. REV. 879, 
880 (1992). 
 13. Blessing, supra note 11, at 2403.  
 14. See Houle, supra note 12, at 880-82. 
 15. Susan J. Latham, Newton v. Diamond: Measuring the Legitimacy of 
Unauthorized Compositional Sampling – A Clue Illuminated and Obscured, 26 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 119, 122 (2003). 
 16. Eric Shimanoff, The Odd Couple: Postmodern Culture and Copyright 
Law, 11 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 12, 24 (2002). 
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audiences, local DJs began modifying the music they played 
using turntables and a stereo mixer while talking-over the 
music in a chant-like manner.17 
In 1974, Jamaican DJ Clive Campbell, a.k.a. “Kool Herc,” 
moved to the South Bronx of New York and introduced his 
country’s innovative style of music to the United States.18  Kool 
Herc became a neighborhood sensation and word of his unique 
style and popularity spread quickly.19  Local DJs began to 
emulate the methods used by Kool Herc, sampling and rapping 
over the break beats from popular Latin, R&B and disco 
music.20 
As the popularity of this new form of music became 
widespread, competition became fierce and DJs began to look 
for new ways to extract and mix beats.21  In the early 1980s, 
the musical instrumental digital interface (MIDI) synthesizer 
came to the market, allowing hip-hop producers to easily 
sample recordings in the studio and recreate the music that 
DJs were performing live in the clubs.22  As the price of this 
technology fell, hip-hop artists were given affordable access to 
the unique and almost endless possibilities provided by digital 
sampling.23 
In 1979, the commercial release and mainstream success of 
Sugar Hill Gang’s “Rapper’s Delight,” which contained music 
appropriated from Chic’s popular disco hit “Good Times,” 
created questions of the applicability of copyright law to this 
new form of music.24  Unfortunately, the Copyright Act of 1976 
(the “Act”) provided little if any clarity for musicians and those 
in the music recording industry. 
B.  COPYRIGHT LAW 
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
                                                          
 17. Id.; Latham, supra note 15, at 122; see also  Stephen R. Wilson, Music 
Sampling Lawsuits: Does Looping Music Samples Defeat the De Minimis 
Defense?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 179, 182 (2002). 
 18. Latham, supra note 15, at 122. 
 19. Shimanoff, supra note 16, at 25. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 25-26. 
 22. Latham, supra note 15, at 123. 
 23. See Blessing, supra note 11, at 2403-04. 
 24. Jason H. Marcus, Don’t Stop That Funky Beat: The Essentiality of 
Digital Sampling to Rap Music, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 767, 770 
(1991). 
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for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”25  Congress first 
utilized this authority in 1790 by adopting a federal Copyright 
Act, amending it several times since.26  The most recent version 
is the Copyright Act of 1976.27 
The Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.”28  “Originality in the copyright 
sense means only that the work owes its origin to the author, 
i.e., is independently created, and not copied from other 
works.”29  In addition, to command copyright protection a work 
must contain a minimal amount of creativity.30 
A copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce the 
work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies of the work 
publicly, perform the work publicly, display the work publicly, 
and perform the work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission.31  Under section 102(a) of the Act, both “musical 
works, including any accompanying words” and “sound 
recordings” are included as works of authorship.32  This 
complicates matters for musicians attempting to obtain a 
license to sample a song, as they must negotiate a license for 
both the sound recording copyright and the underlying 
composition copyright, which are often owned by two separate 
parties. 
1.  Purpose of Copyright Law 
As the Constitution states, the purpose of music copyright 
protection is to promote the progress of a useful art.33  In other 
words, copyright protection is intended to promote artistic 
creativity and innovation that will be a benefit to the public.34  
                                                          
 25. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 26. Blessing, supra note 11, at 2405. 
 27. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000)).      
 28. Id. § 101.  
 29. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
2.01 (2004). 
 30. Id.  (“Illustrative of the requirement of minimal creativity are those 
cases that deny copyright protection to fragmentary words or phrases, 
noncreative variations of musical compositions, numbers generated 
sequentially or randomly, and to forms of expression dictated solely by 
functional considerations.”). 
 31. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 32. Id. § 102(a). 
 33. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 34. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) 
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To achieve these ends, the Copyright Act grants copyright 
holders a limited monopoly over their work.35  This provides an 
incentive for creation by providing a financial benefit, for 
example, the exclusive right to the revenue from licensing fees, 
sales, royalties, and performance fees.36 
However, “the financial reward guaranteed to the 
copyright holder is but an incident of this general objective, 
rather than an end in itself.”37  As the Supreme Court stated, 
“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object 
in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived 
by the public from the labors of authors.”38  Thus, the benefits 
of copyright protection are intended to promote maximization 
of public benefit.  Any private benefit experienced by creators is 
incidental to this purpose. 
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering 
Congress to grant copyright protection is the belief that the 
economic benefit provided by the limited monopoly is the best 
way to advance public welfare.39  However, “courts in passing 
upon particular claims of infringement must occasionally 
subordinate the copyright holder’s interest in a maximum 
financial return to the greater public interest in the 
development of art, science, and industry.”40 
Congress recognized that the economic interests of 
copyright holders must give way to the “public interest” in 
development of the arts and sciences when limiting the 
monopoly power granted in the Act.41  For example: copyrights 
are subject to a limited duration of exclusivity;42 sound 
recording copyrights are limited to the actual sound recording, 
and do not apply against those that imitate or simulate the 
copyrighted work;43 and the doctrine of fair use protects the 
public interest by granting exemptions for certain educational 
                                                                                                                            
(“The immediate effects of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 
‘author’s’ creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to 
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”). 
 35. See Shimanoff, supra note 16, at 18. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Berlin v. E.C. Publ’n, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1964). 
 38. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). 
 39. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 40. See Berlin, 329 F.2d at 544. 
 41. See id. 
 42. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). 
 43. Id. § 114(b). 
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uses, news reporting, and criticism.44  The Supreme Court 
acknowledged this when stating that the fair use doctrine 
requires “courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright 
statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity 
which the law is designed to foster.”45  Thus, in determining 
what constitutes copyright infringement, courts must balance 
the incentives to create provided by the monopoly powers of 
copyright with the public’s interest in promoting the 
development of art, science and industry. 
2.  What is Copyright Infringement? 
The Supreme Court has held that the fundamental 
elements of a prima facie case of copyright infringement are: 
“(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of 
constituent elements of the work that are original.”46  This 
comment will not address all of the intricacies of establishing 
the ownership and validity of a copyright, but will instead focus 
on the question plaguing the digital sampling music industries 
today: what amount of copying is necessary to establish 
copyright infringement? 
Two distinct components exist within the copying element.  
First, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant actually used 
the copyrighted work as a “model, template, or even 
inspiration” when creating the disputed work.47  However, even 
if copying is proven, the plaintiff must also show that it rose to 
a legally cognizable level.48  Recently, some courts and legal 
scholars have reformulated the prima facie case of 
infringement to add “unlawful appropriation” as a required 
element in an effort to emphasize the need to show both actual 
and actionable copying.49 
If actual copying cannot be proven with direct evidence, a 
                                                          
 44. Id. § 107. 
 45. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
 46. NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.01 (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)). 
 47. Id. at § 13.01[B].  See also Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Group, 
Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(quoting NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.01[B]). 
 48. See id. 
 49. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond (“Newton II”), 349 F.3d 591, 594 (9th 
Cir. 2003), aff’g Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1256-
59 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 
(2d Cir. 1997); NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.01 n. 26.3; Wilson, supra note 17, 
at 185. 
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plaintiff may prove copying by introducing circumstantial 
evidence demonstrating that the defendant had access to the 
copyrighted work and that the disputed work is “substantially 
similar” to the copyrighted work.50  However, some legal 
commentators and recent cases have found the term 
“substantially similar” is “more properly used . . . after the fact 
of copying has been established, as the threshold for 
determining that the degree of similarity suffices to 
demonstrate actionable infringement.”51  In an attempt to 
clarify this double use of the term “substantially similar,” the 
Second Circuit and the Nimmer treatise on copyrights, among 
others, have adopted Professor Alan Latman’s suggestion that 
the term “probative similarity” should be used for the 
determination of copying, and the term “substantial similarity” 
should be used for the determination of whether the copying 
rises to a legally cognizable level.52  For purposes of clarity, 
these definitions will be used throughout the rest of the 
commentary. 
As noted previously, the factual determination of copying 
relies upon a showing of access and probative similarity.  
Probative similarities are “similarities that, in the normal 
course of events, would not be expected to arise independently 
in the two works” and “are probative of defendant’s having 
copied as a factual matter from plaintiff’s work.”53  Probative 
similarity is a question of fact.54  Once the fact finder has 
determined that the defendant has actually copied from the 
copyright protected material, they must then determine 
whether the copying rose to a legally cognizable level. 
To demonstrate that copying has risen to a legally 
cognizable level, a plaintiff must prove that the copyrighted 
and disputed works are substantially similar.55  The question of 
what constitutes substantial similarity is one of the most 
difficult questions in copyright law due to the seemingly 
ambiguous and subjective tests for infringement used by the 
                                                          
 50. See Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74; NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.01[B]. 
 51. Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74; see also NIMMER, supra note 29, §§ 13.02-
.03. 
 52. Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74-75; NIMMER, supra note 29, at § 13.03[A]; 
Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling 
Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1204 (1990). 
 53. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[B]. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74-75; NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[A]. 
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courts.56  On one extreme there is virtually no similarity, on the 
other exact similarity, and substantial similarity lies 
somewhere in between.  Judge Learned Hand addressed this 
issue when he stated “[t]he test for infringement of a copyright 
is of necessity vague,” and the line will seem arbitrary 
wherever it is drawn.57 
A few law review authors have commented that the 
language of section 114(b) of the Copyright Act58 granting the 
copyright holder the exclusive right to create derivative works 
from the “actual sounds” of the recording precludes the use of 
the substantial similarity test altogether.59  However, many 
other scholars, and most recent court decisions, have not 
adopted this strict reading of the Act and have included 
substantial similarity as a necessary element of a sound 
recording infringement action.60 
A derivative work is defined by the Copyright Act as: 
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a . . . 
musical arrangement, . . . sound recording, . . . abridgment, 
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, 
transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, 
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, 
represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”.61 
However, a work is considered derivative only if it “has 
substantially copied from a prior work.”62  A work that contains 
only negligible amounts of previously registered or published 
material will be considered a new work, not a derivative 
work.63  “To be an infringement the derivative work must be 
based upon the copyrighted work.”64  Consequently, if an artist 
samples an insubstantial amount of a prior work and 
                                                          
 56. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[A]. 
 57. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d 
Cir. 1960). 
 58. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2000). 
 59. See, e.g., Latham, supra note 15 at 125; Marcus, supra note 24, at 776. 
 60. See, e.g., Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 288 (D.N.J. 
1993); Newton v. Diamond, (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal. 
2002); Tuff 'N' Rumble Mgmt., Inc. v. Profile Records, Inc., 1997 WL 158364 at 
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997); J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case for 
Rethinking Music Copyright Protection, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
407, 416 (2004); Wilson, supra note 17, at 183. 
 61. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 62. NIMMER, supra note 29, § 3.01. 
 63. JOHN W. HAZARD, JR., COPYRIGHT LAW IN BUSINESS AND PRACTICE, § 
2:22 (rev. ed. Oct. 2004). 
 64. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5675 (emphasis added). 
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incorporates it into a new work, they have not violated section 
114(b) of the Copyright Act because they have not infringed 
upon the right of the copyright owner to create derivative 
works.65  As Nimmer summarizes, “[t]he practice of digitally 
sampling prior music to use in a new composition should not be 
subject to any special analysis: to the extent that the resulting 
product is substantially similar to the sampled original, 
liability should result.”66 
3.  Defenses to Copyright Infringement Claims 
The principles of substantial similarity and de minimis use 
have been used interchangeably by many courts and scholars.67  
To the contrary, these are two distinct principles, each with 
different legal implications on copyright issues.  By definition, 
the de minimis test satisfies the quantitative analysis of 
substantial similarity, but not the qualitative.  In practice, 
however, the term “de minimis” has been used to describe the 
defendant’s defense that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate 
substantial similarity. 
a.  De Minimis Use 
The principle of de minimis use is directly related to, but 
not a substitute for, the substantial similarity doctrine.  The 
legal maxim de minimis non curat lex or “the law does not 
concern itself with trifles” has been applied throughout many 
areas of the law, including copyright.68  To establish that 
copying is de minimis, the defendant must show that it was so 
trivial “as to fall below the quantitative threshold of 
substantial similarity, which is always a required element of 
actionable copying.”69  In other words, if the amount taken from 
the copyrighted work is so small that it could not be considered 
a legally cognizable infringement, the copying is considered de 
minimis and the substantial similarity requirement has not 
                                                          
 65. See HAZARD, supra note 63, § 2:22. 
 66. NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[A][2]. 
 67. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond (“Newton II”), 349 F.3d 591, 593-95 (9th 
Cir. 2003), aff’g Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002); Newton v. Diamond, (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1258 
(C.D. Cal. 2002); Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 289-91 (D.N.J. 
1993). 
 68. See Wilson, supra note 17, at 185. 
 69. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 
1997); see also Gordon v. Nextel Comm. and Mullen Adver., Inc., 345 F.3d 922, 
924 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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been met. 
The application of this rule, however, has been far from 
uniform.  Courts have been inconsistent in the determination of 
whether or not copying a few notes is de minimis.70  
Additionally, there is some confusion as to whether the 
sampled portion should be viewed in relation to the original 
work, the new work, or both.71 
Ultimately, courts have consistently stated that 
quantitative analysis alone will rarely determine whether a 
particular copying is substantially similar because small 
sections can be sufficiently original or important to be 
considered a substantial portion of the original work.72  
Instead, a copied section of a work must be looked at for both 
its quantitative and qualitative importance.73 
b.  Qualitative Threshold of Substantial Similarity 
The de minimis test may be used to determine the 
quantitative threshold of substantial similarity, but the 
doctrine also calls for examination of a qualitative threshold.74  
Even if the amount copied is quantitatively small, the fact 
finder may find substantial similarity if it is qualitatively 
important.75  Due to the fact that very few digital sampling 
cases make it to court, there are very few applications of the 
substantial similarity test in this context. 
One test that seems to have emerged in a few circuits is 
the ordinary observer/listener/audience test.76  The threshold 
                                                          
 70. See, e.g., Newton v. Diamond (“Newton II”), 349 F.3d 591, 593-95 (9th 
Cir. 2003), aff’g Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002); Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1987); Newton v. 
Diamond,(“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1258 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 71. See Newton II, 349 F.3d 591 (holding that the analysis should only 
focus on the original work and not on the defendants when determining 
whether the copying was de minimis); Ringgold, 126 F.3d 70 (applying the de 
minimis use test by analyzing both the original and the new work). 
 72. See Baxter, 812 F.2d at 425 (holding that six notes is a small amount, 
but that qualitative analysis is also necessary to determine the sampled 
portions importance in the song or originality); Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 
1258 (holding that copying three notes that are not independently original was 
de minimis). 
 73. See Baxter, 812 F.2d at 425; Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1258. 
 74. See Latham, supra note 15, at 132-33; NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03. 
 75. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[B][2]. 
 76. See, e.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 293 (6th Cir. 
2004) (recognizing the “ordinary observer” test); Dawson v. Hinshaw Music 
Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990); Baxter, 812 F.2d at 425; Arnstein v. 
Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946). 
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for substantial similarity in this test has been characterized by 
the courts in several different ways, including whether the 
defendant copied: “the whole meritorious part of the song;”77 
“that portion of the plaintiff’s work upon which its popular 
appeal, and hence, its commercial success, depends;”78 “what is 
pleasing to the ears of lay listeners;”79 “so much . . . that the 
value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the 
original author are substantially to an injurious extent 
appropriated by another;”80 or, “constituent elements of the 
work that are original . . . [and] the value of the original work 
is substantially diminished by the copying.”81  Another recent 
decision adopted the view that substantial similarity would not 
exist unless the defendant had copied enough of the 
copyrighted work where “the ordinary observer, unless he set 
out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook 
them, and regard [the] aesthetic appeal [of the two works] as 
the same.”82  Any similarities detected by the ordinary observer 
should be “without any aid or suggestion or critical analysis by 
others . . . [and] should be spontaneous and immediate.”83  As 
demonstrated, each test is far from clear or even consistent 
with any other test. 
Although some courts and commentators have stated that 
the question of substantial similarity should only focus on the 
relationship to the plaintiff’s work,84 the reasonable listener 
test almost certainly allows the fact finder to be influenced by 
the frequency and the ability to observe the copied material 
within the new work. 
The reasonable listener test has been highly criticized 
because it attempts to force the oft used reasonable person 
standard into an area of law that does not contain widely 
                                                          
 77. Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 
397 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). 
 78. Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 
795, 798 (S.D. Cal. 1956). 
 79. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473. 
 80. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 348 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (giving 
the guiding principle written by Justice Story). 
 81. Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 291 (D.N.J. 1993) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 82. See Newton v. Diamond (“Newton II”), 349 F.3d 591, 594-95 (9th Cir. 
2003), aff’g Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1256-59 
(C.D. Cal. 2002) (internal citations omitted). 
 83. NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[E][1][a] (quoting Harold Lloyd Corp. 
v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1933)). 
 84. See Newton II, 349 F.3d at 597; NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[A][2]. 
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recognized social norms.85  Additionally, whereas the 
reasonable person is assumed to have the same values and 
traits as the ordinary fact finder, it can not be assumed that 
the fact finder has the same musical taste or knowledge as a 
reasonable listener or audience member.86  Although the test 
proves to be extremely inconsistent in its application, it is still 
used in many of the recent digital sampling decisions.87 
c.  Section Copied Not Protected by Copyright 
A copyright only protects the portions of a work that are 
considered copyrightable.88  According to the Supreme Court, 
“[a]s a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those 
constituent elements of a work that possess more than a de 
minimis quantum of creativity.”89  Following this reasoning, 
only original elements of a sound recording or musical 
composition are protected by a copyright.90  Therefore, it is 
unlikely that a single note or beat, unless accompanied by an 
additional creative element, would be protected by copyright.91 
There are many similarities in the analysis of the 
copyrightability of a particular segment of a work and whether 
substantial similarity exists between the two works.  Very 
small portions of a musical work are most likely not protected 
by the copyright unless they are sufficiently original.92  If the 
portion copied is not original, it would follow that the two 
works are not substantially similar due to a lack of any 
unlawful appropriation of a qualitatively important part of the 
copyrighted work.  However, there is evidence that even if a 
copied portion is copyrightable, it may still be deemed to be de 
minimis.93  Therefore, each of these defenses should be argued 
and analyzed separately. 
                                                          
 85. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03 [E][2]; Keyes, supra note 60, at 
431-32. 
 86. Keyes, supra note 60, at 431-32. 
 87. See Newton II, 349 F.3d at 592-93; Newton v. Diamond,(“Newton I”), 
204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. 
Supp. 282, 288 (D.N.J. 1993). 
 88. See Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1252-54; Jarvis, 827 F. Supp. at 291. 
 89. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 
(1991). 
 90. See, e.g., id; Newton I, 204 F. Supp. at 1252-54; Jarvis, 827 F. Supp. at 
291, NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[A][2]. 
 91. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.03[A][2]. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1252-54. 
BRODIN_CLEAN_4-24-05 7/11/2006  6:47:33 PM 
834 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 6:2 
 
d.  Fair Use 
Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides a fair use 
exception to copyright infringement “for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, 
or research.”94  The fair use doctrine allows “courts to avoid 
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it 
would stifle the very creativity that the law was designed to 
foster.”95  The factors to be used when determining whether a 
work constitutes fair use include: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) 
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.96 
These factors operate as a balancing test, none alone being 
positive or dispositive of fair use.97 
The first factor requires the determination of whether the 
new work is commercial or non-commercial in nature.  Creating 
a new work for a commercial purpose is not fatal to a fair use 
defense, but it does weigh against it.98  In Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music99 the Supreme Court stated that the more 
transformative a work is (transformative meaning whether the 
work “adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or 
message”), the more likely it will be deemed fair use.100  The 
Court further stated the more transformative the work, the less 
significance should be given to the other factors.101 
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, 
analyzes the overall originality and creativity of the work.  The 
greater the creativity involved in creation of the copyrighted 
work, the greater the copyright protection, making it less likely 
that the defense of fair use will be accepted.102 
                                                          
 94. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 95. Marcus, supra note 24, at 783 (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research 
Found. v. Am. Broad. Corp., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 96. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 97. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994); 
NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.05[A]. 
 98. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.05[A][1]. 
 99. 510 U.S.569 (1994).  
 100. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See NIMMER, supra note 29, at § 13.05[A][2]. 
BRODIN_CLEAN_4-24-05 7/11/2006  6:47:33 PM 
2005] BRIDGEPORT MUSIC 835 
 
The third factor is often confused with the determination of 
substantial similarity.103  While substantial similarity is a 
required element of a copyright infringement action, its 
presence does not negate a fair use defense.104  In fact, certain 
fair uses, such as a parody, by nature will incorporate a 
significant portion of the original work.105  Although the 
amount of acceptable similarity in fair use differs with the 
substantial similarity determination, the method of analyzing 
both the qualitative and quantitative factors of the original 
work is the same.106  Ultimately, the amount of copying 
permissible will vary with the purpose and character of the 
new work.107 
The fourth and final factor—the effect on the market or 
value of the copyrighted work—requires that the court consider 
both the effect of the current actions as well as “whether 
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by 
the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse 
impact on the potential market for the original”108 or derivative 
works.109  However, only the adverse effects of infringing 
actions should be considered, while the adverse effects of non-
infringing actions, such as copying of non-copyrightable 
material or fair use criticism, should be ignored.110 
Interestingly, the original market for a song often benefits 
once the song has been sampled and used in a new work.111  
However, lack of damages does not negate a finding of 
copyright infringement.112  Ultimately, this factor is used to 
gather evidence of what actual damages, if any, the copyright 
holder has suffered.113 
In Campbell, the Supreme Court stated that a parody can 
                                                          
 103. Id. § 13.05[A][3]. 
 104. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. 
 105. See, e.g., id. 
 106. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.05[A][3]. 
 107. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87. 
 108. Id. at 590 (quoting NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.05[A][4]). 
 109. Id. at 594. 
 110. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.05[A][4]. 
 111. See Shimanoff, supra note 16, at 38-39 (giving examples of artists that 
have benefited from having their songs sampled in a rap song). 
 112. See NIMMER, supra note 29, § 13.05[A][4] n.221. 
 113. See id. (“This factor, rather, poses the issue of whether unrestricted 
and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant (whether in 
fact engaged in by the defendant or others) would result in a substantially 
adverse impact on the potential market for, or value of, the plaintiff’s present 
work.”). 
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be considered fair use even if it is created for commercial 
purposes.114  However, there are many more transformative 
uses that could be considered fair use that have not been 
considered by the courts.  For example, rapper Jay-Z’s use of 
the Broadway musical “Annie” song “Hard Knock Life” in his 
song of the same name was transformative in that it took the 
original message of the difficulty of life in an orphanage and 
altered it to help demonstrate the urban struggle of living in 
the ghetto.115  The original chorus and melody from the 
musical’s theme was sampled and mixed with percussive beats 
and rap lyrics resulting in an extremely successful run at the 
top of the single charts both nationally and internationally.116  
Although Jay-Z paid for a license to sample from “Annie,” his 
use of the song to transform an old message regarding a group 
of underprivileged and exploited orphans to describe the 
current state of children in the ghetto could have been deemed 
fair use.117  Ultimately, the lack of precedent and resulting 
uncertainty in this area have caused most musicians wishing to 
sample for transformative purposes to obtain a license or settle 
outside of court.118 
C.  COPYRIGHT VIOLATIONS AND DIGITAL SAMPLING 
Copyright violation lawsuits involving digital sampling 
have been relatively sparse.  In the past, many hip-hop artists 
employed a “catch me if you can” mentality, releasing records 
full of unlicensed appropriations.119  After the courts began 
holding against digital samplers, however, the artists began to 
question what types of digital sampling constituted copyright 
infringement.120  Unfortunately, the application of the 
Copyright Act in cases of digital music sampling has left a 
confusing and convoluted history that leaves almost no 
certainty as to what constitutes infringement, which party has 
the burden of proof, and what tests are to be applied. 
                                                          
 114. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-88. 
 115. Shimanoff, supra note 16, at 33-35. 
 116. Johnny Black, The Greatest Song Ever! Hard Knock Life, BLENDER, 
Nov. 2002, at http://www.blender.com/guide/articles.aspx?id=827 (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2005). 
 117. See id. 
 118. See Wilson, supra note 17, at 179. 
 119. See Latham, supra note 15, at 123. 
 120. See id. at 124 n.28 (noting that the boundaries for lawful digital 
sampling have not been clearly delineated). 
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1.  Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc. 
Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc.121 
was the first major case holding that digital sampling is a 
copyright violation.122  At issue was the unlicensed use of 
instrumental and lyrical portions of Gilbert O’Sullivan’s “Alone 
Again (Naturally)” in hip-hop artist Biz Markie’s “I Need a 
Haircut.”123  Biz Markie and his record company had attempted 
to obtain a license from O’Sullivan, who rejected them 
outright.124  The record company went ahead and released the 
record without the license and this lawsuit resulted.125 
District Judge Kevin Thomas Duffy started his opinion 
with the Biblical commandment “Thou shalt not steal,” and 
ultimately held that the use of three words and a portion of the 
music from the original song was a per se copyright violation.126  
The court granted the preliminary injunction requested by the 
plaintiffs and further suggested that the case be referred for 
criminal prosecution.127  Although Judge Duffy did not 
explicitly cite to the Copyright Act and state that all digital 
sampling is a per se copyright violation, his opinion was 
consistent with this proposition.128 
Grand Upright was a major blow to the hip-hop 
community.129  Judge Duffy, by ignoring possible defenses of 
lack of substantial similarity or fair use, had created a per se 
copyright violation for digital sampling.  The number of 
unlicensed samples used in commercial releases fell 
significantly after the decision.130  However, this also led to 
fewer samples being used in hip-hop music.131  Many artists 
refused to license songs because of their distaste for hip-hop.132  
                                                          
 121. 780 F. Supp 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 122. See Latham, supra note 15, at 123. 
 123. Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 
182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 124. Id. at 184. 
 125. Id. at 185. 
 126. Id. at 183. 
 127. Id. at 185. 
 128. See id. at 183 (“[T]he defendants in this action for copyright 
infringement would have this court believe that stealing is rampant in the 
music business and, for that reason, their conduct here should be excused.  
The conduct of the defendants herein, however, violates not only the Seventh 
Commandment, but also the copyright laws of this country.”). 
 129. See Latham, supra note 15, at 123-24. 
 130. See Shimanoff, supra note 16, at 30. 
 131. See id. at 31. 
 132. See id. at 30-31. 
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Additionally, many artists who wished to sample were not 
financially capable of paying for licenses in advance.133  
Ultimately, the decision completely protected copyright owners 
while limiting the resources available for hip-hop artists to use 
in creation of new music. 
2.  Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television 
In Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television,134 the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals set forth an oft cited test for 
substantial similarity.  In this case, Ringgold claimed copyright 
infringement for the unlicensed use of her artwork entitled 
“Church Picnic Story Quilt” in the background of an episode of 
the sitcom “ROC.”135  Although this case did not involve music 
copyright infringement, the test applied by the court can be 
easily adapted to the intricacies of digital sampling.  In 
addition, the fact that the actual artwork was used for a short 
period of time along with many other props and decorations is 
similar to a digital sample appearing for a limited amount of 
time in a new work among many other sounds. 
The court in Ringgold held that the substantial similarity 
test required analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative 
components of the copying.136  The de minimis test was used to 
determine the quantitative component, looking solely at the 
amount of the copyrighted work that was copied, “a 
consideration that is especially pertinent to exact copying.”137  
For the qualitative component the court examined the 
“observability of the copied work—the length of time the copied 
work is observable in the allegedly infringing work and such 
factors as focus, lighting, camera angles, and prominence.”138  
Ultimately, the court ruled in this case that the artwork was 
clearly visible for a significant amount of time and therefore 
substantial similarity existed.139 
 
                                                          
 133. See id. 
 134. 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 135. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 136. Id. at 75. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 76-77. 
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3.  Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Management v. Profile Records 
In Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Management v. Profile Records,140 the 
plaintiff claimed that the defendants illegally copied “certain 
drum tracks” from their song “Impeach the President” and used 
them in the songs “Back from Hell” and “Dana Dane with 
Fame.”141  The Southern District of New York first stated that 
to establish unlawful copying a plaintiff “must show (1) actual 
copying, and (2) unlawful appropriation.”142  The court further 
stated that the test for unlawful appropriation is whether the 
works are substantially similar, which ultimately turns on 
“whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged 
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted 
work.”143  Additionally, “in assessing substantial similarity, 
courts look at the works as a whole, as opposed to dissecting a 
work into its constituent elements or features.”144  Essentially, 
the court found that the test for substantial similarity is if a 
person would be able to identify the misappropriation by 
listening to both recordings.145 
The court ultimately granted summary judgment for the 
defendant on several alternate theories.  First, the plaintiff 
could not prove ownership of the copyright for the original 
works.146  Second, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the 
elements of access and probative similarity that establish 
actual copying.147  And finally, the plaintiff failed to 
demonstrate substantial similarity between the songs in 
question.148  Thus, summary judgment was appropriate in this 
case because the plaintiff could not “make out the essential 
elements of the claim.”149 
 
                                                          
 140. 1997 WL 158364 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997). 
 141. Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Mgmt. v. Profile Records, 1997 WL 158364, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997). 
 142. Id. at *3. 
 143. Id. at *5 (quoting Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 
(2d Cir. 1966)). 
 144. Id. at *5. 
 145. See id. at *4. 
 146. Id. at *2-3.  
 147. Tuff 'N' Rumble Mgmt., 1997 WL 158364 at *3-4. 
 148. Id. at *4-5. 
 149. Id. at *2. 
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4.  Jarvis v. A & M Records 
In Jarvis v. A & M Records,150 the District Court of New 
Jersey addressed the issue of substantial similarity in the 
context of digital sampling.  In its analysis, the court adopted 
the fragmented literal similarity test for substantial similarity 
from Nimmer’s treatise.151  This test is based upon the premise 
that the value of the copyrighted work can be “substantially 
diminished even when only a part of it is copied, if the part that 
is copied is of great qualitative importance to the work as a 
whole.”152  The court stated that “[t]he proper question to ask is 
whether the defendant appropriated, either quantitatively or 
qualitatively, constituent elements of the work that are 
original.”153  Therefore, if only a small portion of a copyrighted 
work is taken, it can still be substantially similar if the portion 
is unique enough to be recognized as an important part of the 
original song.  However, “[e]asily arrived at phrases and chord 
progressions are usually non copyrightable.”154 
Applying this test to the case at hand, the court held that 
the “ooh,” “move,” and “free your body” vocals and the unique 
keyboard line that were sampled, though each alone was not 
sufficiently distinctive, were sufficiently original and unique in 
their particular arrangement to be considered substantially 
similar to the copyrighted work.155  Therefore, the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment was denied.156 
5.  Newton v. Diamond 
In a recent Ninth Circuit case, the music group the Beastie 
Boys was sued for the unlicensed sampling of accomplished jazz 
flutist James W. Newton’s performance of “Choir” in their song 
“Pass the Mic.”157  The Beastie Boys had obtained a license for 
the sound recording from ECM Records, but never approached 
Newton for a license for the underlying musical composition.158 
                                                          
 150. 827 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1993). 
 151. Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 290-91 (D.N.J. 1993). 
 152. Id. at 291 (quoting Werlin v. Readers Digest Ass’n, 528 F. Supp. 451, 
463 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)). 
 153. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 292. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Newton v. Diamond (“Newton II”), 349 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 2003), 
aff’g Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal. 2002); 
Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1258 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 158. Newton II, 349 F.3d at 593. 
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The Beastie Boys copied a three note sequence of “C”—“D-
flat”—“C” that lasts for approximately six seconds at the 
beginning of “Choir.”159  The sound was made distinctive by 
Newton’s vocalization technique, singing while simultaneously 
playing each flute note.160  The sample was looped and is heard 
in the background of much of “Pass the Mic.”161 
The Beastie Boys moved for summary judgment on 
Newton’s claim of copyright infringement based on two 
arguments:  that the portion of “Choir” that they sampled 
cannot be protected by copyright as a matter of law; or in the 
alternative, any misappropriation was de minimis, and 
therefore not actionable.162 
a.  The District Court Decision – Newton I 
The district court began with analysis of the 
copyrightability of the three note sequence, noting that the only 
copyright at issue was for the musical composition because the 
Beastie Boys had properly licensed the rights to the sound 
recording.163   
The court found that neither the three note sequence nor 
the vocalization technique were sufficiently unique to justify 
copyright protection, as both are commonly used musical 
techniques and occur only once in the recording of “Choir.”164  
The court noted that Newton’s performance technique, which 
expert testimony showed was quite distinctive, could be 
considered sufficiently unique to justify copyright protection for 
the sound recording, but not for the underlying composition.165 
In the alternative, the court found that the Beastie Boys 
copying of “Choir” was de minimis.166  The court stated that a 
taking is de minimis “if the average audience would not 
recognize the misappropriation.”167  Additionally, the court 
stated that  
[i]n such cases, “where there unquestionably is copying, albeit of only 
a portion of [a] plaintiff’s song . . . [t]he proper question to ask is 
whether the defendant appropriated, either quantitatively or 
                                                          
 159. Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1246. 
 160. Id. at 1246-47. 
 161. Id. at 1246. 
 162. Id. at 1247. 
 163. Id. at 1248-50. 
 164. Id. at 1253. 
 165. Newton I, 204 F. Supp. 2d  at 1252. 
 166. Id. at 1259. 
 167. Id. at 1257. 
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qualitatively, ‘constituent elements of the work that are original’ such 
that the copyright rises to the level of an unlawful appropriation.”168   
In assessing the qualitative and quantitative importance of 
the copied segment, the court looked only at its relation to the 
original work and ignored its use in the new work.169 
Quantitatively, the segment copied represented only two 
percent of the entire “Choir” recording, which the court held 
insufficient to overcome a de minimis finding.170  Similar to its 
analysis of the copyrightability of the copied segment, the court 
found that the copying of three commonly used notes from a 
musical composition could not satisfy the substantial similarity 
test.171  Integral to this finding was the court’s determination 
that Newton’s actual sound recording should be ignored in the 
qualitative analysis.172  Instead, the question the court 
addressed was “whether someone might recognize—from a 
performance of the notes and notated vocalization alone—the 
source as the underlying musical composition.”173 
Thus, due to the fact that the segment copied was 
quantitatively small and the underlying musical composition 
contained no qualitatively unique or distinctive elements, the 
court found that the use was de minimis and not actionable as 
a matter of law.174  In the language of the court, “no substantial 
similarity [will] be found if only a small, common phrase 
appears in both the accused and complaining songs . . . unless 
the reappearing phrase is especially unique or qualitatively 
important.”175 
b.  The Court of Appeals Decision – Newton II 
The court of appeals upheld the decision of the district 
court based solely on the argument that the use of the three 
notes was de minimis and therefore not substantially similar, 
choosing not to address the other argument.176 
                                                          
 168. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. 
Supp. 282, 289-91 (D.N.J. 1993). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1258. 
 171. Newton I, 204 F.Supp.2d at 1258-59. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 1258. 
 174. Id. at 1259. 
 175. Id. at 1256-57 (alteration in original) (citing Jean v. Bug Music, Inc., 
2002 WL 287786 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2002)). 
 176. Newton v. Diamond (“Newton II”), 349 F.3d 591, 592-93 (9th Cir. 
2003), aff’g Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal. 
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The court adopted the Ringgold requirement that “[f]or an 
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work to be actionable, there 
must be substantial similarity between the plaintiff’s and the 
defendant’s works.”177  However, the court looked to Fisher v. 
Dees,178 the leading de minimis case in the Ninth Circuit, for 
the applicable quantitative and qualitative tests for substantial 
similarity.179  The court observed in Fisher that “a use is de 
minimis only if the average audience would not recognize the 
appropriation.”180  The court further adopted Nimmer’s 
fragmented literal similarity analysis, explaining that “the 
dispositive question is whether the similarity goes to trivial or 
substantial elements.  The substantiality of the similarity is 
measured by considering the qualitative and quantitative 
significance of the copied portion in relation to the plaintiff’s 
work as a whole.”181  The court intentionally did not look at the 
use of the sampled portion in the defendant’s work, stating that 
if this were analyzed the sample could be intentionally buried 
or distorted by the defendant to escape liability.182  In the 
present case, however, the Beastie Boys had looped the sample 
throughout almost the entire song.183 
The court held that the sampled portion was neither 
quantitatively nor qualitatively significant to the plaintiff’s 
work.184  The segment was only three notes played over six 
seconds, or roughly two percent of the entire work, and was not 
repeated.185  Newton argued that his technique of overblowing 
the notes was a distinctive feature of the segment.186  However, 
this ultimately worked to his disadvantage because no such 
technique was noted on his written composition, and the 
Beastie Boys had obtained a proper license for the recording.187 
                                                                                                                            
2002). 
 177. Newton II, 349 F.3d at 594. 
 178. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 179. Newton II, 349 F.3d at 594-95 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th 
Cir. 1986)). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 596. 
 182. Id. at 597. 
 183. Newton II, 349 F.3d at 597. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Id. at 598. 
 187. Id. 
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II.  BRIDGEPORT MUSIC, INC. V. DIMENSION FILMS LLC 
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC188 was one 
of 476 cases severed by the court from the plaintiff’s original 
complaint, which included approximately 500 causes of action 
and 800 defendants.189  This case brings forward the questions 
of the copyrightability of short segments of an original work, as 
well as the relevance of the substantial similarity defense in 
the context of digital sampling. 
A.  BACKGROUND 
In May 1998, the defendant released the film “I Got the 
Hook Up,” which included a recording of the NWA song “100 
Miles and Runnin’” (“100 Miles”) on its soundtrack.190  
Originally, the musical composition copyright to “100 Miles” 
was co-owned by Dollarz N Sense Music (“DNSM”), Ruthless 
Attack Muzick (“RAM”), Stone Agate Music, and Hancock 
Music.191  The defendant claimed that in the summer of 1998 
the original owners of the musical composition of “100 Miles” 
granted it an oral license to use their composition in the film, 
and in June 2002 executed synchronization licenses retroactive 
to the film’s release date.192   
In December 1998, as compensation for the use of a sample 
from the George Clinton song “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” (“Get 
Off”), Bridgeport (the owner of the “Get Off” musical 
composition copyright) acquired a twenty-five percent interest 
in the musical composition for “100 Miles.”193  Bridgeport 
argued that the oral licenses and synchronization licenses 
“authorize[d] the use of each of the original owner’s interest, 
not the work in its entirety.”194  Therefore, Bridgeport argued, 
the defendant was not authorized to use Bridgeport’s twenty-
five percent interest in the “100 Miles” musical composition 
and was not authorized to use the sample from the “Get Off” 
musical composition.195 
                                                          
 188. 230 F. Supp. 2d 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films LLC (“Bridgeport II”), 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004) 
 189. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC (“Bridgeport I”), 230 
F. Supp. 2d 830 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films LLC (“Bridgeport II”), 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004) 
 190. Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 833. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
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Westbound Records, Inc. (“Westbound”) owned the 
copyright to the “Get Off” sound recording.196  Westbound 
brought a copyright infringement claim against the defendants 
alleging unauthorized sampling of the “Get Off” sound 
recording.197 
The segment of “Get Off” that was sampled is described as:  
an arpeggiated chord—that is, three notes that, if struck together, 
comprise a chord but instead are played one at a time in very quick 
succession—that is repeated several times at the opening of “Get Off.”  
The arpeggiated chord is played on an unaccompanied electric guitar.  
The rapidity of the notes and the way they are played produce a high-
pitched, whirling sound that captures the listener’s attention and 
creates anticipation of what is to follow.198 
The sample comprised of a two second portion of the chord 
that was looped fourteen to sixteen times, appearing as a seven 
to eight second long segment in five different parts of “100 
Miles.”199  The sampled chord, which was used to evoke the 
sound of a police siren in the background of the new work, was 
slowed and the pitch was lowered to match the tempo of “100 
Miles.”200 
“Get Off” is a celebratory song about dancing with a 
“strong dance beat and a display of intricate electric guitar 
playing” accompanied by the lyrics of two expletives followed by 
“get off your ass and jam” repeated throughout the song.201  By 
comparison, “100 Miles” is a hip-hop song “about four black 
men on the run from the F.B.I. who appear to be wrongfully 
pursued for some unmentioned crime.”202 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION – BRIDGEPORT I 
The district court’s decision in Bridgeport was in response 
to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  The 
defendant asserted that it could not be found liable for 
copyright infringement for several reasons: 
(1) it possessed a valid license from at least one of Bridgeport’s co-
owners of the allegedly infringed work “100 Miles and Runnin” . . . (2) 
Bridgeport executed a release related to “100 Miles”; (3) the portion of 
Bridgeport’s composition “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” . . .that was 
sampled by “100 Miles” is de minimis and therefore not subject to the 
                                                          
 196.  Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 833. 
 197. Id. at 838. 
 198. Id. at 839. 
 199. Id. at 841. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 842. 
 202. Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at. at 841. 
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protection of the copyright laws; and (4) the portion of Westbound’s 
sound recording of “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” that was sampled by 
“100 Miles” is de minimis and therefore not subject to the protection 
of the copyright laws.203 
The first issue the district court addressed was whether 
the oral or synchronization licenses granted by the original 
owners gave the defendant the right to copy from the 
composition.204  The court held that the defendant provided 
sufficient evidence to prove that the oral licenses existed and 
that the synchronization licenses simply recorded the 
agreement.205  Further, the court noted that each copyright 
owner has the right to license the use of the musical 
composition as long as the proceeds are appropriately divided 
and the other owners’ use and exploitation of their interest is 
not encumbered.206  Therefore, the court granted summary 
judgment for the defendants on all claims pertaining to the 
musical composition.207 
The only remaining claim was whether the defendant 
infringed upon plaintiff Westbound’s copyright for the sound 
recording of “Get Off,” which was not licensed by the 
defendant.208  The defendant offered two reasons why this 
claim should fail: “(1) the portion of “Get Off” that was copied 
was not original and therefore not protected by copyright law; 
(2) the sample of “Get Off” was legally insubstantial and 
therefore the sample did not amount to actionable copying 
under copyright law.”209  For the purpose of the summary 
judgment motion, the court assumed that the sample was 
digitally copied from the sound recording of “Get Off.”210 
1.  Originality of the Copied Portion 
The defendant asserted that the chord that was sampled 
from “Get Off” was a “commonly used collection of notes that, 
standing alone, is not entitled to copyright protection.”211  The 
court held that although a valid copyright raises a rebuttable 
presumption of originality for the entire song, a defendant may 
                                                          
 203. Id. at 832. 
 204. See id. at 833-38. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 838. 
 208. Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 838.  
 209. Id. at 838. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 838-39. 
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still prove that the particular element sampled is unoriginal 
and not entitled to copyright protection.212 
Examining the copied chord, the court stated that “the 
question does not turn on the originality of the chord, but in the 
use of and the aural effect produced by the way the notes in the 
chord are played, especially here where copying of the sound 
recording is at issue.”213  After listening to the arpeggiated 
chord in “Get Off,” the court found that a reasonable jury could 
conclude that it is original and creative and consequently 
protected by copyright.214  Thus, summary judgment on the 
theory of lack of originality was denied.215 
2.  Copied Portion Not Substantially Similar 
The defendant also asserted that even if the segment 
copied was protected by copyright, it “is neither quantitatively 
nor qualitatively significant to the plaintiffs’ copyright 
interests in “Get Off” and therefore any copying of the chord is 
not actionable as a matter of law.”216 
The court began its analysis by noting that the Sixth 
Circuit has recognized that the de minimis principle “can be 
applied as a defense to copyright infringement if it can be 
shown that a substantial amount of the copyrighted work was 
not taken.”217  Ultimately, the court stated, it was asked to 
“balance the interests protected by the copyright laws against 
the stifling effect that overly rigid enforcement of these laws 
may have on the artistic development of new works.”218  
Additionally, the court noted that the lack of case law 
addressing digital sampling or clear road maps of how to apply 
the de minimis test from circuit courts or the Supreme Court 
would complicate the process.219 
According to the court, de minimis analysis falls under the 
quantitative element of the substantial similarity element that 
is necessary to prove actionable copying.220  In general, the 
court felt that the test for substantial similarity was “whether 
                                                          
 212. Id. at 839. 
 213. Id.  
 214. Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 839. 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 839-40. 
 218. Id. at 840. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 840. 
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an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as 
having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”221  The 
court then adopted the language from Newton I and Jarvis, 
stating that the question is “whether the defendant 
appropriated, either quantitatively or qualitatively, 
‘constituent elements of the work that are original.’”222  The 
court also acknowledged Nimmer’s fragmented literal 
similarity test.223   
The court found that the two second guitar chord was 
quantitatively small in comparison to the plaintiff’s work, but 
noted that it played a significant role in the defendant’s 
song.224  In analyzing the qualitative element, the court began 
by noting that the two songs were very different in nature with 
virtually no similarities in tone or mood.225  Additionally, the 
copied chord had been altered to such an extent that it would 
not be “recognizable to a lay observer as being appropriated 
from the plaintiffs’ work,” even “one familiar with the works of 
George Clinton.”226 
The court summarized its reasoning as follows: 
The Court recognizes that the fact of blatant copying is not 
challenged by the defendant for the purposes of this motion, and 
that the purposes of the copyright laws is to deter wholesale 
plagiarism of prior works.  However, a balance must be struck 
between protecting an artist’s interests, and depriving other artists 
of the building blocks of future works.  Since the advent of Western 
music, musicians have freely borrowed themes and ideas from other 
musicians. If even an aficionado of George Clinton’s music might not 
readily ascertain that his music has been borrowed, the purposes of 
copyright law would not be served by punishing the borrower for his 
creative use.227 
Ultimately, the court held that the copied chord was so 
small in size and unrecognizable as a misappropriation that the 
two songs could not be considered substantially similar.  Thus, 
the court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the 
sound recording copyright claim.228 
                                                          
 221. Id. at 840 (quoting Tuff 'N' Rumble Mgmt., Inc. v. Profile Records, 
Inc., 1997 WL 158364 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997)). 
 222. Id. at 841 (quoting Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 
1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (quoting Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 
291 (D.N.J. 1993)). 
 223. Id. at 841.  
 224. Id.  
 225. Id. at 841-42. 
 226. Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 842. 
 227. Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 842 (internal citations omitted). 
 228. Id. at 843. 
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C.  SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS – BRIDGEPORT II 
Westbound appealed from the district court’s 
determination that the defendant’s copying was de minimis 
and therefore not actionable.229  Westbound challenged the 
district court’s “articulation of the applicable standards and its 
determination that there was no genuine issue of fact 
precluding summary judgment on this issue.”230  At “[t]he heart 
of Westbound’s arguments [was] the claim that no substantial 
similarity or de minimis inquiry should be undertaken at all 
when the defendant has not disputed that it digitally sampled 
a copyrighted sound recording.”231  The Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals noted the defendant’s objection that this argument was 
made for the first time upon appeal, but in the exercise of 
discretion decided to examine this argument due to its 
importance to the resolution of the issue.232 
Before directly addressing Westbound’s argument, the 
court of appeals laid out several general observations about the 
nature and scope of its holding.  First, the court of appeals 
stated the analysis for determining copyright infringement for 
a musical composition is not the same as the analysis that 
should be applied for a sound recording.233  The court of appeals 
agreed with the district court’s analysis as it would apply to a 
musical composition, but, because this case involved a sound 
recording, the court of appeals departed from this reasoning.234  
The decision in this case was limited to the specific realm of 
digital sampling due to the Sixth Circuit’s self-recognized 
limited technological knowledge.235  Finally, the court of 
appeals noted that the “music industry, as well as the courts, 
are best served if something approximating a bright-line test 
can be established.  Not necessarily a ‘one size fits all’ test, but 
one that, at least, adds clarity to what constitutes actionable 
infringement with regard to the digital sampling of copyrighted 
sound recordings.”236 
The court of appeals began its analysis with a review of the 
                                                          
 229. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (“Bridgeport II”), 383 F.3d 
390, 393 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 230. Id. at 395. 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. at 396 n.4. 
 233. Id. at 396. 
 234. Id.  
 235. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 396. 
 236. Id. at 397. 
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applicable language from the Copyright Act.  Specifically, the 
court  of appeals focused on the language of sections 114(a) and 
106(2) that give the owner of a sound recording copyright the 
exclusive right “to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work.”237  Section 114(b) of the Act further specifies 
that the exclusive right “under clause (2) of section 106 is 
limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in which the 
actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, 
remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality,” but does 
not “extend to the making or duplication of another sound 
recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of 
other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate 
those in the copyrighted sound recording.”238 
According to the court of appeals, “copyright laws attempt 
to strike a balance between protecting original works and 
stifling further creativity.”239  The balance applicable to 
copyright protection of sound recordings, as interpreted by the 
court of appeals, is that the owner has the exclusive right to 
duplicate the recording, while “the world at large is free to 
imitate or simulate the creative work fixed in the recording.”240  
Ultimately, the court believed that the seminal question in the 
case of digital sampling was “[i]f you cannot pirate the whole 
sound recording, can you ‘lift’ or ‘sample’ something less than 
the whole.”  The court’s answer “to that question [was] in the 
negative . . . . In other words, a sound recording owner has the 
exclusive right to ‘sample’ his own recording.”241 
The court of appeals offered several reasons to support its 
interpretation of the Copyright Act.  First, “there is ease of 
enforcement.  Get a license or do not sample.”242  The court of 
appeals did not view this as “stifling creativity in any 
significant way,” because an artist could hire a musician to 
duplicate the song in the studio.243  Second, the market will 
keep the license price within bounds because it will have to be 
less than the cost to duplicate the sample with musicians in the 
studio.244  Third, “sampling is never accidental . . . you know 
                                                          
 237. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106(2)(2000)). 
 238. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(b)). 
 239. Id. at 398. 
 240. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 398. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 398-99. 
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you are taking another’s work product.”245 
The court of appeals then addressed the specific question of 
why the de minimis and substantial similarity principles apply 
to the musical composition, but not to the sound recording.246  
As discussed previously, the court of appeals believed its 
interpretation was supported by the text of the Copyright 
Act.247  Additionally, the court of appeals stated that “even 
when a small part of a sound recording is sampled, the part 
taken is something of value.”248  As proof, the court of appeals 
offered the fact that producers sample to add something new to 
the record, save costs, or both.249 
The court of appeals then explained that although the 
district court did an excellent job of applying the de minimis 
and substantial similarity analysis, the case illustrated “the 
kind of mental, musicological, and technological gymnastics 
that would have to be employed” if this were the test adopted 
by the courts.250  The value of the bright-line rule proposed 
becomes apparent, the court of appeals explained, when 
considering that the district court has 800 other cases involving 
digital sampling.251  However, the court of appeals also 
emphasized that “considerations of judicial economy” were not 
what drove its opinion.252 
The court of appeals further acknowledged the fact that its 
decision followed no existing judicial precedent.253  However, it 
did note that “[s]everal law review and text writers, some of 
whom have been referenced in [the] opinion, have suggested 
that this is the proper interpretation of the copyright statute as 
it pertains to sound recordings.”254  Though there were many 
opposing scholarly works, the court of appeals noted “where one 
stands depends on where one sits.”255 
In response to the assertion that its holding would stifle 
creativity, the court of appeals stated that “many artists and 
record companies have sought licenses as a matter of 
                                                          
 245. Id. at 399. 
 246. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 399. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id.  
 252. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 399-400. 
 253. Id. at 400. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 401. 
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course.”256  Additionally, the recordings created before 1971 are 
not protected by the Copyright Act.257  Ultimately, the court of 
appeals believed that licensing costs would not affect the ability 
of artists to sample, and that older works not protected by 
copyright would provide a cheap alternative.  Notably, the 
court of appeals concluded that “the record industry, including 
the recording artists, has the ability and know-how to work out 
guidelines, including a fixed schedule of license fees, if they so 
choose.”258 
Finally, the court of appeals stated that its analysis was 
consistent with a “literal reading” of the Copyright Act.259  The 
court of appeals did not find much assistance from the 
legislative history of the Act because digital sampling was not 
an issue when the laws were created.260  The court of appeals 
stressed that if the record industry wants clarification of or 
changes made to the Copyright Act, it has the ability to go back 
to Congress: 
This is the best place for the change to be made, rather than in the 
courts, because as this case demonstrates, the court is never aware of 
much more than the tip of the iceberg.  To properly sort out this type 
of problem with its complex technical and business overtones, one 
needs the type of investigative resources as well as the ability to hold 
hearings that is possessed by Congress.261 
Based on its new formulation of the copyright protection of 
sound recordings, the court of appeals reversed the entry of 
summary judgment on Westbound’s claims.262 
III.  ANALYSIS 
In Bridgeport II, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals lost 
sight of the purpose of copyright protection and misinterpreted 
the language of the Copyright Act.  Although the bright-line 
rule established by the court of appeals will make judicial 
determination of infringement of a sound recording copyright 
much easier, the rule is not supported by judicial precedent, a 
“literal reading” of the Copyright Act, or the overall purpose of 
copyright protection.   
                                                          
 256. Id. 
 257. Id.  
 258. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 401. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 402. 
 262. Id.  
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A.  IGNORING PERSUASIVE JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided to ignore all 
persuasive decisions from other circuits in favor of a few 
academic and business articles supporting the strict rule 
announced by the court of appeals.  Specifically, the court of 
appeals ignored the language in the holdings and dicta of Tuff 
‘N’ Rumble, Newton I, and Newton II that supported the use of 
the substantial similarity test in sound recording copyright 
infringement claims. 
The court of appeals simply overlooked these cases, stating 
“[w]e have not addressed in detail any of the cases frequently 
cited in these music copyright cases because in the main they 
involved infringement of the composition copyright and not the 
sound recording copyright.”263   However, the Second 
Circuit in Tuff ‘N’ Rumble applied the substantial similarity 
test to determine if there was actionable copying in a claim 
involving both the composition and the sound recording 
copyrights.  Further, although Newton I and II dealt only with 
the copyright to the musical composition, both courts explained 
in dicta how Newton’s unique performance style would apply to 
a substantial similarity determination for the sound recording, 
but not for the underlying composition. 
Although these decisions were not binding on the Sixth 
Circuit, they were the only judicial decisions previously 
discussing the sampling of a sound recording.  The district 
court recognized these decisions and the court of appeals 
should not have dismissed them so easily.  Had the court of 
appeals followed the tests laid out in the other circuits, it is 
likely that summary judgment would have been granted due to 
a lack of substantial similarity.   
1.  Applying the Tuff ‘N’ Rumble Analysis 
The Tuff ‘N’ Rumble court’s test for substantial similarity 
was whether, in looking at the two works as a whole, “‘an 
average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as 
having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.’”264  In 
Bridgeport I, the district court stated that even a George 
Clinton aficionado—much less an average lay observer—would 
                                                          
 263. Id. at 400 n.13. 
 264. Tuff 'N' Rumble Mgmt., Inc. v. Profile Records, Inc., 1997 WL 158364 
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997)(quoting Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 
1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966)). 
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not recognize the use of the sampled chord in “100 Miles.”265  
The chord has been slowed and the pitch lowered so that it is 
unrecognizable from its original form.  Consequently, the 
threshold for substantial similarity—recognized appropriation 
by an average lay observer—was not met in Bridgeport I.  
Therefore, the application of the Tuff ‘N’ Rumble test in 
Bridgeport I supported summary judgment for the defendant 
due to lack of substantial similarity.   
2.  Applying the Jarvis Analysis 
The Jarvis court stated that “[t]he proper question to ask 
is whether the defendant appropriated, either quantitatively or 
qualitatively, constituent elements of the work that are 
original.”266  The district court in Bridgeport I found that the 
sampled chord was quantitatively small in comparison to the 
plaintiff’s work, although it played a more significant role in 
the defendant’s work.267  According to the Jarvis court, if only a 
small portion of a copyrighted work is taken, it can still be 
substantially similar if the portion is unique enough to be 
recognized as an important part of the original song.  However, 
the chord in Bridgeport I from “Get Off” is altered to such an 
extent that the qualitatively unique elements of the chord are 
unrecognizable to the lay observer.  Therefore, the sample used 
in “100 Miles” cannot be recognized as an important part of the 
original song and did not satisfy the elements of the Jarvis 
substantial similarity test.  Thus, in the absence of 
quantitatively significant or qualitatively recognizable copying, 
summary judgment for the defendant in Bridgeport I would 
have been appropriate. 
3.  Applying the Newton I and II Analysis 
The courts in Newton I and II, much like the court in 
Jarvis, stated that there is not substantial similarity “if the 
average audience would not recognize the misappropriation.”268  
                                                          
 265. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (“Bridgeport I”), 230 F. 
Supp. 2d 830, 842 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films (“Bridgeport II”), 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 266. Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 291 (D.N.J. 1993) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 267. Bridgeport I, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 841. 
 268. Newton v. Diamond (“Newton II”), 349 F.3d 591, 594-95 (9th Cir. 
2003), aff’g Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal. 
2002); Newton v. Diamond (“Newton I”), 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 
2002).  
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In Newton I and II the courts held that an average audience 
would not recognize the misappropriation of three notes in 
respect to the musical composition.  Both courts noted, 
however, that the sample would probably violate the sound 
recording copyright, which the Beastie Boys had properly 
licensed, due to Newton’s unique style.  As discussed 
previously, however, the chord sampled from “Get Off” is 
altered so significantly that an average audience would not be 
able to recognize the misappropriation.  Thus, although the 
chord is unique within Clinton’s song, it was still not 
recognizable as a misappropriation within “100 Miles.” 
4.  Applying the Ringgold Analysis 
The Ringgold court held that substantial similarity 
depended upon the “observability of the copied work—the 
length of time the copied work is observable in the allegedly 
infringing work and such factors as focus, lighting, camera 
angles, and prominence.”269  Applying this to the Bridgeport I 
digital sampling context, the question becomes the amount of 
time the sample is used in the infringing work and its 
recognizability in respect to the other sounds.  The sampled 
chord from “Get Off” can be heard in a little less than forty 
seconds of “100 Miles,” which is far from insignificant.270  
However, due to the manipulation of the sound of the chord and 
its use within a completely different style of music, the sample 
is virtually unrecognizable when compared to the original.  If 
the sample is unrecognizable, then it cannot be observable for 
any amount of time in the new work.  Ultimately, if the 
copyrighted work cannot even be identified within the 
infringing work, it is unlikely that substantial similarity 
should be found. 
5.  Conclusion 
It is highly likely that the application of any of the tests 
laid out in  previous cases would result in summary judgment 
for the defendant in Bridgeport I due to lack of substantial 
similarity.  However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals chose 
not to address these persuasive holdings, but instead focused 
its analysis upon  its reading of the Copyright Act.  
                                                          
 269. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 
1997).  
 270. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 394. 
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B.  A “LITERAL READING” OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE HOLDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
In its decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals relies 
upon the language of sections 106 and 114 of the Copyright Act 
that grants the copyright owner the exclusive right to make 
derivative works.  However, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation 
of the statutory language does not take into account the 
purpose of each of the clauses in context to the whole and 
ignores the meaning of the term “derivative works.” 
Section 106 of the Copyright Act is intended to establish 
the rights exclusive to the owner of the musical composition 
copyright.271  Section 114(a) extends many of these rights to 
sound recording copyrights, including the right to create 
derivative works.272  Section 114(b), however, actually limits 
the right to create derivative works to the actual sounds from 
the sound recordings, clearing the way for imitation.273 
Under the Sixth Circuit’s reading of 114(b), the use of the 
words “actual sounds” creates an absolute right in the 
copyright holder to sample from the sound recording.274  A 
better reading of this section indicates that the words “actual 
sounds” are words of limitation intended to show that the 
copyright protection of a sound recording does not extend to the 
ideas of the sounds, but only to the actual sounds 
themselves.275  It does not follow that because copyright 
protection of a sound recording is limited to the actual sounds 
that the right to sample those sounds is absolute.  If Congress 
intended for the right to be absolute, the language required to 
convey the idea could be extremely clear and unambiguous.  
Ultimately, the court of appeals took words of limitation and 
created an unconvincing and strained argument that they were 
intended to give the owner of a sound recording copyright the 
absolute right to sample from the recording.   
The better interpretation of section 114(b) is that the 
exclusive right to create derivative works provided to the owner 
of a sound recording copyright is the same as the right provided 
to the owner of a musical composition copyright, but limited to 
the actual sounds on the recording.  Thus, the creator of a new 
work is subject to a composition infringement claim only if 
                                                          
 271. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).  
 272.  Id. § 114(a).  
 273.  Id. § 114(b).   
 274. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 394. 
 275. See Nimmer, supra note 29, § 8.05. 
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there has been an illegal appropriation of the original work, 
which is ultimately determined using the substantial similarity 
test.   
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit generally ignored the 
definition of “derivative work” within the context of section 
114(b).  As defined in section 101, a work must be “based upon” 
a preexisting work to be considered “derivative.”276  This 
indicates that there must be some minimal level of similarity 
between the two works for the new work to be considered 
derivative.  As Nimmer states, a work is only derivative if it 
“has substantially copied from a prior work.”277  Consequently, 
both 114(b) and 101 require “substantial similarity” between 
the copyrighted work and the new work to prove that there has 
been an illegal appropriation. 
It would be a far stretch to say that “100 Miles” is based on 
or is substantially similar to “Get Off.”  One chord lasting two 
seconds was copied from “Get Off,” and it is so significantly 
altered that, in the words of the district court, “even an 
aficionado of George Clinton’s music might not readily 
ascertain that his music has been borrowed.”278 Additionally, 
“100 Miles” cannot seriously be considered a musical 
arrangement, condensation, adaptation, or any of the other 
examples of derivative works listed in section 101.  Ultimately, 
Westbound cannot establish a copyright violation because “100 
Miles” is neither substantially similar to, nor a derivative work 
of “Get Off.”  Therefore, the court of appeals erred in reversing 
the district court’s summary judgment decision. 
C.  THE HOLDING BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO 
THE PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
The purpose of copyright protection, as stated in the 
Constitution, is to promote the progress of a useful art.279  As 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals put it, “[t]he copyright laws 
attempt to strike a balance between protecting original works 
and stifling further creativity.280  However, the decision 
announced by the court of appeals in Bridgeport II did 
                                                          
 276. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 277. NIMMER, supra note 29, § 3.01 (emphasis in original). 
 278. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (“Bridgeport I”), 230 F. 
Supp. 2d 830, 842 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films (“Bridgeport II”), 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 279. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 280. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 398. 
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everything possible to protect original works while 
backhandedly dismissing all evidence that its new rule would 
significantly stifle creativity. 
1.  Ease of Application Does Not Excuse Inconsistency with the 
Law 
The first argument offered by the court of appeals in 
support of its bright-line rule was ease of enforcement.281  It is 
apparent that the court of appeals believed that the existing 
tests for substantial similarity and de minimis use were 
confusing and unpredictable, causing trouble for both the 
judicial system and for the music industry. 
In concluding its analysis, the court of appeals admitted 
that there is no “Rosetta stone” for interpretation of the 
Copyright Act.282  Technological and musical advances have 
progressed much further than the drafters of the statute could 
have imagined, and the laws as written are difficult to apply 
today.  However, the fact that the language is difficult to apply 
does not give a court a license to find additional rights in words 
of limitation, especially rights that ultimately violate the 
purpose of the Copyright Act itself.  Instead, a court is bound 
by a duty to apply generally accepted existing tests or to create 
new tests that remain consistent with the law.  Congress alone 
has the right to expand or constrict the rights of copyright 
holders. 
Although ease of application is a valid concern, the test 
must be consistent with the textual meaning and purpose of 
the law itself, regardless of whether it is difficult to apply or 
predict.  The holding of the court of appeals is easy to apply; 
however, it is not consistent with the Copyright Act.283 
2.  The Act Was Not Intended to Protect the Livelihood of 
Studio Musicians 
Next, the court of appeals argued that copying even a small 
portion of a sound recording is taking something of value.284  As 
proof, the court of appeals stated that artists’ main reason for 
sampling was to save money by avoiding hiring studio 
musicians to simulate the sounds, a problem it characterized as 
particularly dangerous to the music profession because “‘the 
                                                          
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 401. 
 283. See supra Part III.B. 
 284. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 399. 
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musician is being replaced with himself.’”285  The court of 
appeals seems to lament the fact that the old ways of creating 
music are, in some modern music genres, being replaced with 
new technology that eliminates much of the need for live 
musicians.   
However, it is the purpose of the Copyright Act to promote 
the creation of new art, not to ensure that studio musicians 
continue to get paid for simulating old sounds.  The rationale of 
the court of appeals has nothing to do with this purpose.  
Hiring a studio musician to simulate a sound from an existing 
work, as the court of appeals would have artists do, is not the 
creation of new art; nor does it promote creation by rewarding 
the original author. 
In any case, it seems highly unlikely and uneconomical 
that NWA would hire a studio musician to come in and play 
one chord so that they could record it and digitally alter it for 
their song.  Additionally, many artists are not signed by a 
record company and cannot afford studio time, much less studio 
musicians.  Consequently, artists will be discouraged from 
using small segments, which would not in themselves qualify 
for copyright protection, to create new and unique songs.  
Ultimately, the argument of the court of appeals does not 
protect the original creator and actually discourages future 
creative musical works. 
3.  Requiring Licensing of All Samples Will Diminish Creativity 
The court of appeals further defended its position by noting 
that many artists receive licenses for samples as a matter of 
course, and that there is a large body of music that is not 
protected by copyright.286  The court of appeals once again, 
however, missed the point.  Many artists sample enough of a 
pre-existing work so that it is substantially similar to their new 
work.  Licensing is always necessary in these circumstances.  
The fact that some artists do pay for licenses to sample a single 
chord does not demonstrate that it will not stifle creativity.  
Artists that have the money may wish to avoid the uncertainty 
of litigation and pay for a license for everything they sample.  
However, the creativity of those artists that cannot afford to 
license every beat and note they sample will be significantly 
                                                          
 285. Id. at 399, n.11 (quoting Christopher D. Abrahamson, Digital 
Sampling and the Recording Musician: A Proposal for Legislative Protection, 
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660, 1668 (1999)). 
 286. Id. at 401. 
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curtailed by this decision. 
Similarly, the fact that there is a body of music that is not 
protected by a sound recording copyright does not absolve the 
court of appeals of the fact that the holding eliminates access to 
all music recorded for more than the last thirty years.  The 
ruling of the court of appeals effectively limits the pool of 
available resources for modern artists that sample small pieces 
of existing works to create something new and original, thus 
hindering creativity.  
The court of appeals also failed to adequately acknowledge 
the practical result of its decision.  In reality, creativity will be 
significantly affected as a considerable amount of music will 
become too expensive or impossible to license.  The court of 
appeals gave absolute monopoly power to the copyright owners 
over the sounds that they record.  This will give them a 
significant bargaining advantage over the potential sampler.  
In addition, the lack of a mandatory licensing system will make 
it possible for artists that do not consider hip-hop a valid art 
form to deny a sampling license, ultimately stifling the very 
creativity that the copyright act was intended to promote. 
Additionally, many hip-hop artists will be forced to 
abandon sampling or reduce the number of samples used in a 
new song.  Chuck D and Shocklee from the group Public Enemy 
believed that the decision in Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. 
Warner Bros. Records, Inc.287 significantly hurt hip-hop because 
the samples became too expensive, and incorporating multiple 
samples into a song was almost impossible.288  They opined 
that this eliminated an artist’s ability to take many 
unrecognizable samples and create a collage.289  Indeed, Public 
Enemy was forced to change their entire sound because of the 
overwhelming cost of sampling after Grand Upright.290  The 
decision in Bridgeport II marks a return to the extremely strict 
per se infringement rule first handed down in Grand Upright, 
and will ultimately lead to reduced creativity and creation. 
 
                                                          
 287. 780 F. Supp 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 288. See Kembrew McLeod, How Copyright Law Changed Hip Hop: An 
Interview With Public Enemy’s Chuck D and Hank Shocklee, STAY FREE!, Fall 
2002, available at 
http://www.stayfreemagazine.org/archives/20/public_enemy.html (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2005). 
 289. See id. 
 290. Id. 
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4.  It Is Outside the Authority of the Court to Pressure the 
Music Industry into a Mandatory Licensing System 
The court of appeals further rationalized its decision by 
stating that the music industry has the ability and the know-
how to create a mandatory licensing system for digital 
samples.291  The decision will likely put pressure on the 
industry to create pricing guidelines for digital sampling; but 
the ends do not justify the means.  It is not within the 
authority of a court to encourage a mandatory licensing scheme 
for a practice that is not in itself a violation of the copyright 
law.  Any licensing scheme must be consistent with the laws 
contained in the Copyright Act, as must any decision by the 
judiciary.  This decision, as well as any licensing scheme that 
results from it, is not consistent with the Copyright Act. 
Additionally, there is still a significant amount of sampling 
that will satisfy the substantial similarity test and put 
significant pressure on the music industry and on Congress to 
create a mandatory licensing system that is consistent with the 
purposes of copyright protection. 
5.  There Is No Intent Element In the Copyright Act 
The final argument the court of appeals gave for its 
holding was that digital sampling is never an unintentional 
copying.292  However, the elements necessary to demonstrate a 
prima facie case of copyright infringement do not include the 
showing of a particular state of mind.  This protects the 
copyright holder by allowing the copyright holder to prove 
infringement without having to show that a defendant 
knowingly copied from the copyrighted work.  An artist that 
subconsciously copies a significant amount of another artist’s 
work has infringed upon the copyright as much as a person 
who intentionally samples a significant amount of another’s 
work.  The same is true for de minimis copying: an artist who 
copies a de minimis amount of another’s work has not infringed 
upon the copyright regardless of whether it was intentional or 
unintentional. 
6.  Conclusion 
Any private benefit experienced by creators is incidental to 
the purpose of maximization of public benefit from the arts.  
                                                          
 291. Bridgeport II, 383 F.3d at 401. 
 292. Id. at 399. 
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The reason that copyright owners have limited rights over the 
musical composition and sound recording is so that they are 
encouraged to create new works.  However, it is highly unlikely 
that artists will decide not to create because a few seconds of 
their sound recording could be copied, altered into a very 
different sound, and incorporated into a new work that is very 
different from the original.  The bright line test laid out by the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bridgeport II will 
significantly reduce the pool of sounds that can be sampled to 
create new and original works, ultimately working against the 
purpose of the Copyright Act. 
D.  THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION IS THE PROPER DECISION 
As the court of appeals noted, the district court did a very 
good job of navigating the applicable de minimis and 
substantial similarity tests based upon the statutes and the 
available digital sampling case law.  The fundamental 
difference between the two decisions was the Sixth Circuit’s 
interpretation of section 114(b) of the Copyright Act, which it 
believed granted the copyright holder the exclusive and 
absolute right to sample from the sound recording.  However, 
as discussed previously, the correct interpretation is that the 
language in this section actually limits, not enhances, the 
rights of the copyright owner.  Thus, had the court of appeals 
correctly interpreted the Copyright Act, it most likely would 
have applied the substantial similarity test and arrived at the 
same conclusion as the district court. 
The district court’s analysis demonstrates how difficult it is 
to apply the substantial similarity test.  However, it also 
clearly illustrates that the courts can apply the test to achieve 
an outcome consistent with the purpose of the copyright laws.  
The district court did an excellent job of navigating the 
relevant case law and statutes.  As the district court concluded, 
the elements necessary to prove infringement of a sound 
recording copyright are: (1) valid ownership of the copyright; 
(2) copying of the work by the defendant; and, (3) substantial 
similarity between the copyrighted work and the allegedly 
infringing work.293 
                                                          
 293. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (“Bridgeport I”), 230 F. 
Supp. 2d 830, 840 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (“The plaintiff must show, in addition to 
proof of copying, that the copied work and the allegedly infringing work are 
substantially similar.”), rev’d, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films 
(“Bridgeport II”), 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004).  
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The substantial similarity test consists of a quantitative 
analysis—the de minimis determination—and a qualitative 
analysis.  Copying is de minimis when the amount taken is so 
insignificant that the law will not consider it actionable.  
However, even small segments can have significant value to a 
work, so the qualitative analysis will almost always be 
necessary.  As the district court stated, substantial similarity 
exists when “‘an average lay observer would recognize the 
alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted 
work.’”294  This ultimately requires both a qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of the copied segment both in the original 
work and the new work.  The district court, similar to the court 
in Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television,295 examined the 
quantitative and qualitative importance of the copied segment 
in relation to the original work, as well as the recognizability 
and prominence of the segment within the new work. 
Although this test will require a rigorous analysis by 
judges and juries, it is more reflective of the language and 
purpose of the Copyright Act than the bright line rule 
announced by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.  As with most 
laws, the Copyright Act needs to be updated by Congress to 
reflect the technological and musical  advancements of the past 
thirty years.  Nevertheless, until this occurs the courts must 
apply the law that exists in the way that it was intended.  The 
district court decision in Bridgeport I remained true to the 
language and purpose of the Copyright Act and should not have 
been reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Copyright Act of 1976 was not written with digital 
sampling in mind.  Consequently, the courts have had much 
difficulty creating tests that are consistent with the language 
and purpose of the Act and are predictable and easy to apply.  
In an attempt to clarify this area of the law, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals created a bright-line rule making any 
sampling of a sound recording a per se infringement.  Although 
this rule is predictable and easy to apply, it is inconsistent with 
the language and purpose of the Copyright Act.  Ultimately, 
the district court decision, which required the owner of a sound 
recording copyright to prove unlawful appropriation by 
                                                          
 294. Id. at 840 (quoting Tuff 'N' Rumble Mgmt., Inc. v. Profile Records, 
Inc., 1997 WL 158364 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997)). 
 295. 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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demonstrating substantial similarity, is the correct 
interpretation of the law as it is written.  The substantial 
similarity test provides protection against the copying of 
significant portions of a copyrighted work while allowing 
insignificant copying that will ultimately benefit the general 
public in the form of new original works. 
 
 
